Comments on the proposed revisions to the 1926 Hurricane Season
From the Best Track Supervisory Committee
[Reply to comments provided in bold and bracketed. May 2010 - CWL]
Track Chart: The legend entries for storms 6 and 7 are reversed, with storm 6 showing the dates of storm 7 and vice versa.
General comment: There is a concern that the radius of maximum winds may be specified too precisely given the data available, and that the RMW’s should perhaps be rounded off to the nearest 5 n mi. Could you please comment on the precision of the RMW figures?
[Agree to round the RMW values to the nearest 5 nmi. These were primarily obtained from the Ho et al. study. While generally accurate, they do tend to be overly precise.]
Storm #1, 1926:
1. Are any observations available from the Lesser Antilles on this system?
[Additional observations were provided for the Caribbean from Mike Chenoweth from his trip to archive in England in 2008. Specifically for this hurricane, observations were obtained from the following locations - Antigua: July 22, 12Z, 1015 mb, SE winds (no speeds), 2.18” rainfall; July 23, 12Z, 1014mb, SE winds, 0.43” rainfall. Montserrat: July 22, 12Z, 1013 mb, ENE winds, 2.17” rainfall; July 22, 18Z, 1010 mb, NE winds; Lowest barometer – 1006 mb at July 23, 0730Z; July 23, 12Z, 1012 mb, S winds, 0.08” rainfall. Dominica – July 22, 12Z, 1015 mb, 5.4” rainfall; July 22, 18Z, 1008 mb; “Storm on night of 22nd”; July 23, 12Z, 1013 mb, 0.36” rainfall. None of these new observations necessitate any changes to either the reanalyzed track or intensity.]
2. July 23 description: “system was a Category 1 hurricane was centered at”. Please remove the second “was”.
[Because of confusion of what was being provided in these sentences in the daily descriptions, they are being removed. All significant changes are discussed in the summary paragraphs.]
3. July 23 description: “the system was a Category 1 hurricane” and “Analyzed to be a Category 2 hurricane”. This is confusing. Please clarify.
[See above. The “Analyzed to be a Category 2 hurricane…” statement is summarizing Boose et al.’s findings. This is now clarified.]
4. July 23 and July 24 descriptions: The damage and casualties for Puerto Rico are mentioned both days. Perhaps both entries could be moved to the summary section?
[Given that the summary paragraphs are to be focused upon changes to the existing HURDAT, it is preferable to keep these impact descriptions in the daily section. Both entries are now found in the July 23rd section.]
5. July 24: The proposed new HURDAT keeps the system at 90 kt despite being very near Hispaniola. Is there data to show this occurred, or could some weakening due to land interaction be introduced here? It is also noted that the original HURDAT was described as being “accurate”, yet its intensities were changed.
[There are no data that indicate that the hurricane maintained 90 kt as it brushed Hispaniola. It is agreed that it likely weakened some because of land interactions before reintensifying before hitting the Bahamas. HURDAT is now revised to show weakening between 00 and 18Z on the 24th.]
6. July 25: “observations suggest the Category 3 hurricane was centered near”. None of the subsequent observations for that day suggest Category 3 strength. What observations show Category 3 status?
[See comment above in #2.]
7. “but they are both undoubtedly very high”. Is there evidence to back up this speculation about the damage and casualties at Nassau?
[An estimate of 106 fatalities and numerous damage descriptions were obtained from Neely (2006) and included in the metadata.]
8. Please discuss the eastward track adjustment near Florida on July 27-28.
[The changes introduced just before landfall were very minor – 0.2 degrees southward and 0.4 degrees eastward at 12Z 27th and 0.3 degrees northward and no change east-west at 12Z 28th. The change on the 27th was based upon consideration of all ship and Florida observations and is a compromise between the original HURDAT position and that shown in the Historical Weather Maps. The 28th position is moved northward to better account for Merritt Island being a peripheral pressure, rather than a central pressure. This change is a compromise between what was originally in HURDAT and that proposed by Ho et al. for their landfall location.]
9. Please mention the 975 mb pressure at Merritt Island, Florida in the appropriate daily description.
[This is included in the July 28th summary section.]
10. What evidence supports the 14 n mi RMW at the Florida landfall? What is the estimate based on?
[The 14 nmi RMW at Florida landfall is from the Ho et al. study. They had estimated this from the Jacksonville Weather Bureau wind observations, which are included in the excel database and printed in full from the Original Monthly Record. While likely overly precise, this hurricane does appear to have a somewhat smaller RMW than average for this central pressure (967 mb) and this landfall latitude (29.0N).]
Storm #2, 1926:
1. Are there any observations available from Bermuda on August 6-7?
[Mark Guishard of the Bermuda Weather Service provided observations from the Prospect Hill Observatory in Bermuda: Lowest Pressure Observed – 1000 mb on August 6th, Highest Wind Observed – 47 kt SE on August 6th. No times available. These observations in combination with a fortuitous set of ship observations and the lack of mention in the Bermuda hurricane history do suggest a slightly weaker system at its closes approach to Bermuda.]
2. A ship report shown as 2300Z August 7 in the text is listed as 1100Z in the data table. Which is correct?
[23Z is correct and is now changed in the excel database.]
3. What was the reasoning for boosting the winds during the extratropical transition on August 7-8?
[The above mentioned ship report of 975 mb peripheral pressure concurrent with hurricane force winds late on the 7th suggests winds of at least 78 kt from the north of 35N Neumann et al. pressure-wind relationship. As the system was undergoing extratropical transition, winds are boosted slightly from 75 to 80 kt at 00Z on the 8th.]
4. The damage report in the August 7 description could possible go in the summary section at the end?
[Given that the summary paragraphs are to be focused upon changes to the existing HURDAT, it is preferable to keep these impact descriptions in the daily section.]
Storm #3, 1926:
1. The landfall intensity is shown as 100 kt/955 mb at 2300Z August 25, yet the best track entry for 0000Z August 26 is 90 kt/955 mb. A weakening of 10 kt in an hour may be a little too much over the Marshes of south Louisiana. The committee suggests changing the 0000Z track entry to 95 kt and perhaps raising that pressure a millibar or two.
[Agreed to raise the winds at 00Z to 95 kt. However, the central pressure values in HURDAT – following the convention of Jarvinen et al. (1984) – are actual observed measurements or well-calibrated analyses within 2 hr of the synoptic time. Thus matching how HURDAT has been constructed for every year from 1851 to the late 1970s, the value of 955 mb should be retained in HURDAT at the 00Z entry.]
2. Please supply the reference to Ortiz that is mentioned in the August 20 description.
3. August 21 description: “analyzes an open trough of low pressure centered near”. Troughs do not normally have centers! Please revise this.
4. August 22 description: First, “available observations suggest the kt tropical storm” needs to have an intensity value. Second, some additional discussion of the reduced intensity of the storm near Cuba is necessary. What are the observations that justify the reduction? What did Perez have to say about this system?
[This sentence has now been removed. Perez indicated a tropical storm impact from this system that moved northwestward just west of the western tip of Cuba. Relatively few observations are available for this system. Instead of HURDAT beginning this as an instantaneous 60 kt tropical storm at 00Z on the 22nd, it is estimated that it became a tropical storm around 12Z on the 21st and steadily increased in intensity. The intensity values are reduced some on the 22nd, but not as much as originally proposed.]
5. Was the observation of 87 kt in Houma, Louisiana coincident with the 959 mb pressure? If so, the central pressure may have been lower than 955 mb.
[The 87 kt entry for Houma is incorrect. No anemometer measurement, nor visual estimate, from Houma was available. This is now corrected in the writeup.]
6. The 986 mb observation in Plaquemine Louisiana should be mentioned in the appropriate daily section.
7. Could the center have passed near Lake Charles, Louisiana (1004 mb and near calm?) What other observation are available from the inland portions of Louisiana, including Baton Rouge, Alexandria, and Lafayette?
[Additional wind and pressure observations were obtained for Morgan City. Baton Rouge, Alexandria and Lafayette had only volunteer observers that measured temperature and rainfall (Climatological Data publication provided). Plotting up the available 00Z 27th data including the 1004 mb 3 kt wind at Lake Charles does suggest a position closer to Lake Charles than previously indicated. However, given the available observations and that there appears to be a general low bias in the Lake Charles anemometer records, it appears that the center of the decaying tropical storm stayed north of the town by about 45 nm.]
8. The last sentence in the metadata states “No change is made to the decay of this hurricane”, which is inconsistent with the preceding sentences.
[This is now clarified to say: “No change is made to the dissipation of this hurricane after 18Z on the 27th.”]
9. Connor mentions a 15 ft storm tide at Houma. Have any SLOSH runs be created for this system to see if the landfall parameters can generate this tide?
[From Jeff Pereira of the NHC Storm Surge group: “I attached two MEOWs and flagged a few grid cells in the vicinity of Houma, LA for a CAT 3 and CAT 4 storm; moving North at 15MPH at High Tide. The CAT 3 MEOW captured 13.8 ft above the datum (NAVD88) while the CAT 4 MEOW captured 17.0 ft above the datum (NAVD88). According to these MEOWs, a surge value of 15' feet could very well be an accurate finding for this area considering we are using updated basin data. Please let us know if we can help out in any other way.” Thus the assignment of Category 3 at landfall in Louisiana for this hurricane appears reasonable based upon this one observation and the SLOSH MEOWs.]
Storm #4, 1926:
1. Are there observations available from Bermuda?
[Observations provided for Prospect Hill, Bermuda from Mark Guishard indicate that no tropical storm force winds were observed there in association with this tropical cyclone. However, a minimum sea level pressure (for the month) was observed on the 13th at 1006 mb on the 13th and 2.02” maximum daily rainfall (for the month) was observed on the 14th. These are now included in the writeup.]
2. The committee has conflicting concerns about the intensities on September 14-15. One member thinks that the smooth seas encountered in the eye on September 14 suggest a system weaker than Category 2. On the other hand, another member is concerned that reducing the winds from 120 to 95 kt may be too much. Could you please provide a more detailed reasoning for the intensity changes on those dates?
3. In the September 14 description, there is mention of an observation of 70 kt and 975 mb. Is this from the subsequently mentioned ship Mayaero? If so, the summary section mentions a 60 kt/975 mb observation from this ship. Please clarify this. Also, are the UTC times given for the Mayaero ob in the September 14 section correct? Can the Mayaero ob be combined with the estimated forward speed to estimate an eye diameter and RMW?
[In addition to the text about the S.S. Mayaro on page 399, the Ocean Gales and Storms table on page 392 provides more information from this ship. Here we find that the ship measured a 60 kt S wind at the same time as the minimum 975 mb pressure observed by the Mayaro (at 12Z on the 14th). (Apparently, the ship did not record the pressure while in the eye.) The ship did report a maximum wind of 70 kt NE wind (Beaufort force 12) at an unknown time. While it is clear that the cyclone was still a hurricane, the smooth seas in the eye are suggestive that the 120 kt originally in HURDAT are too high. Winds are reduced to 95 kt, but this is done so with substantial uncertainty. (Because of the lack of knowledge of the ship’s movement, estimating the eye diameter and RMW are problematic.]
4. Are the tropical-storm force winds in the United States on September 15 directly associated with the hurricane or due to cold air advection behind a front?
[The tropical storm force winds observed late on the 15th at Cape Hatteras were likely due to the direct effect of the hurricane, but with some enhancement from the substantial cold air advection behind the front.]
5. Summary section: “winds in HURDAT are boosed from 95 kt”. This needs to be “boosted”.
Storm #5, 1926:
1. Can any evidence be found for this system in the tropical Atlantic prior to the current first best track position?
[Data are sparse over the eastern subtropical North Atlantic before the 10th of September. Certainly the system did not actually originate as a 60 kt tropical storm initially, but data preclude a more realistic assessment.]
2. Since September 15 is being removed from HURDAT, please provide a more detailed explanation as to why.
[Observations on the 15th indicate that this system no longer maintained a closed low, as it had opened up into a trough as indicated by numerous observations. (However, the frontal structure shown in HWM on the 15th does look suspect given the rather warm, isothermal field.)]
Storm #6, 1926:
1. September 10 description: Please provide more information about the observations showing a tropical depression on this day. The committee notes that the Historical Weather Maps are at best ambiguous about the existence of the system on September 10.
[Agreed. We will retain the original HURDAT of the system starting at 00Z on the 11th.]
2. September 16 description: What is the relevance of mentioning the thunderstorms and the rainfall total at Miami? Please delete this if not relevant.
3. More relevantly, what are the wind and pressure observations from Miami and Key West on September 16-17? Is there any useful information on the strength of the system from them?
[There were no tropical storm force winds or low pressures observed at either Miami or Key West Weather Bureau station. Key West, however, did measure a peak NW wind of 23 kt at 01Z on the 17th. This is consistent with a 30 kt TC southeast of Key West.]
4. Summary section: The winds are chosen to be 40 kt on September 15 – higher than those suggested by the wind pressure relationships – because of the lower environmental pressures around this storm? Please clarify this, as it doesn’t make any sense!
[Agreed, the winds on the 15th are kept at 35 kt.]
Storm #7, 1926:
1. Has the information on the Miami landfall been coordinated with Brian Jarvinen’s earlier work on this hurricane, especially regarding the landfall RMW?
[Brian Jarvinen graciously provided the following answer:
“Hi Chris and Jack,
Over the years I did a fair amount of research on the 1926 hurricane,
especially its impact on south Florida, which includes Miami, Lake
Okeechobee and the west coast of Florida. At one point, the storm surge
group created the Biscayne Bay basin as it existed in 1926. Of interest
is that Miami Beach was just being developed and was mostly sand.
Sea-level spoil areas existed where Dodge Island (i.e.the cruise port)
exists today. The MacArthur Causeway, with an elevation of about 5-feet
above sea level, was the most significant east-west barrier with
openings at each end. The Miami Weather Bureau Office obs initially
suggested that the hurricane passed directly over that location, but
closer inspection of the original record obtained from NCDC shows that
the strongest measured gust of 80 mph from the northeast occurred at
4:59 AM as the northwestern part of the eyewall passed over. The next
highest gust of 60 mph from the southeast was measured at 8:56 AM when
the southeastern portion of the eyewall passed over. One question, are
these gust maxima at or near the RMW in that particular quadrant? If
so, this suggests the Miami office was in the eye for about 3-4 hours.
The wind data from an anemometer on top of the Allison Hospital on Miami
Beach suggested that that site was at or near the RMW. When we made a
SLOSH model run with the track directly over the Miami office and an RMW
of 6 nm and 935 mb central pressure we did not even come close to the
observed storm tide elevations along Miami Beach, Miami and Ft.
Lauderdale. Further investigation suggested that the southern portion
of the eyewall passed south of Homestead and Florida City. I estimated
that the northern RMW passed just north of the Allison Hospital on Miami
Beach and south of Homestead or a distance of approximately 38 nm. The
half-way point is just south of the Charles Deering Estate. A SLOSH
model run was made with the track just south of the Charles Deering
(25.6N, 80.3W) with an RMW of 19 nm and a central pressure of 930 mb.
The SLOSH model results were much closer to the observed high water
marks at all locations, including the 7.4 foot value that we measured at
the Charles Deering location based upon photos of the debris line near
the house, that were taken right after the hurricane. Note: The
animation of this SLOSH run, but with the modern day elevations, is
available in the SLOSH display program that Will Shaffer's group
produces. In the modern basin, the Miami Beach barriers are higher than
in 1926 and the Port of Miami is a major east-west barrier with
elevations of 13 feet at the east end and 10 feet at the west end.
There was a really great eye-witness account by a gentleman who was
walking with his friend to view the damage and get some breakfast in
downtown Miami when the rain stopped at 7 AM. They were walking in the
eye along Biscayne Boulevard. They had difficulty standing because of
the strong wind, and had to walk at a 45 degree angle, but made it to a
dinner that was open. They did not observe any flooding at Bayfront
Park, where many ships were docked, during their walk. They would not
have been very far from the Miami Weather Bureau Office. Thus, they were
likely walking into the wind which was blowing from the east or
southeast. While eating, "the second storm started, was worse than the
first storm and was accompanied by a tidal wave, which washed boats up
two blocks from the waterfront". The Charles Deering track SLOSH
model run confirms, during the first phase of the hurricane, that while
Miami Beach was being over topped by the storm tide with a wind from the
northeast, the water inside of northern Biscayne Bay was being driven
south and not piling up near Bayfront Park. An eye-witness account at
Dinner Key also confirms this. The flooding at Biscayne Park and Dinner
Key, which pushed and floated the ships inland, occurred when the
southeastern part of the eyewall passed over and the water was driven
toward the northwest and north. Water piling up in northern Biscayne
Bay over-topped Miami Beach from the bay side and created channels
across the island. I used 930 mb because of the likely pressure
gradient between the center and the Miami office (935 mb). It could
have been a little lower. I have tried over the years to find
eye-witness accounts south of the track without success. Obviously,
wind speeds would have been considerably less on the south side and
damage also less.
As the hurricane crossed southern Florida the RMW likely expanded and
the pressure began rising such that it was 950 mb when the center passed
over the "Barracks" on the west coast at Punta Rassa. The Barracks was
an old Army Signal Corps Station. Since it took approximately 9 hours
to cross the state, the average filling rate was about 2 mb/hr. Using
the Lake Okeechobee SLOSH model and inputting the levee locations and
elevations that existed in 1926, plus the lake elevation at the time, we
were able to replicated the flooding that took place as a result of the
levee being over-topped. As you know there were many drowning
fatalities in and around Moore Haven due to the over-topping. I think
we estimated the maximum sustained wind speed on the lake at 95 to 100
mph. The Miami WFO made a copy of a DVD that we made showing an
animated loop of the flooding on Lake Okeechobee for the 1926 and 1928
hurricanes and what would happen with the current levee systems if those
hurricanes were to repeat. I believe we labeled the SLOSH input values,
at the closest point of approach, in the headers before each animation.
I don't remember exactly what we did for our estimates for SLOSH input
for Pensacola Bay, but I think your values are reasonable for the
Pensacola landfall. The track direction, RMW and 955 mb would likely
have produced the 7.2 foot storm tide that was observed at the Pensacola
Based upon Brian’s analysis, the reanalysis for landfall in SE Florida is slightly adjusted (from what was originally proposed) with the latitude moved south by 0.1 deg, the central pressure dropped by 3 mb, and no change to the winds at landfall.]
2. Is it known which weather stations caught in this storm were using the 3-cup anemometers and which were using the 4-cup anemometers? This could have an impact on how the wind reports are assessed both here and for other storms.
[All of the Weather Bureau stations were still using the old style 4 cup anemometer until 1 January 1928 (MWR 1927). The Miami Beach reading during the hurricane was with a new 3-cup Robinson anemometer was from Allison Hosptial.]
3. Is there a need to add a third landfall in Louisiana or Mississippi, and did the cyclone produce hurricane conditions in Mississippi that would require an MS1 entry in HURDAT?
[Agreed, that a third landfall is required for Mississippi, as the hurricane’s center went back over the Gulf of Mexico near Mobile and moved westward between the barrier islands and the Alabama and Mississippi coast. The third landfall occurred around 16Z on the 21st near 30.4N 89.1W with maximum winds around 60 kt. Based upon the track, intensity and size of the cyclone, Category 1 conditions were likely observed in Mississippi as well (along the barrier islands), which is new to HURDAT.]
4. The committee is very concerned about the changes in track and intensity on September 11-14 with so little supporting evidence. Please provide the data that justifies these changes or use the values from the original HURDAT. It should be noted that the summary section mentions reducing the winds on September 14 based on available data, but no data is actually mentioned there or in the daily section.
[Agreed. No changes are now introduced for the 11th to the 14th.]
5. September 16 description: “Land highlights: 87 kt NW and…” and “Turks Island: ‘At 1:55 pm…”. The multiple references to Turks Island are confusing. Could you please re-write this?
6. Multiple high-resolution surface maps for September 18 could be very useful.
[Agreed. This has been done for 00Z, 12Z Sep 18th and 00Z, 12Z Sep 19th. Other times have too few observations to be useful.]
7. Over Florida, the Kaplan-DeMaria models shows the winds decreasing from 125 kt to 76 kt in 6 hr? This seems a bit extreme given recent experience with other storms crossing the peninsula. Could the 1800Z wind on September 18 be higher than 90 kt? That being said, what is the basis for raising the wind to 100 kt on 0000Z September 19?
[It is agreed that the Kaplan-DeMaria model is understating the wind for a Florida peninsula hurricane, which is why the 18Z value selected – 90 kt – is substantially higher than provided by the model. Note that we also have the 950 mb central pressure from Punta Rassa, which suggests winds of 105 kt from the north of 25N pressure-wind wind relationship. However, the maximum winds at this time were still overland. Adjustment from marine exposure to open terrain over land is a 15% reduction (Vickery et al. 2009), or down to about 89 kt. Winds at 18Z are thus estimated to be 90 kt, given that the hurricane was close to the west coast after passing the Everglades (so, higher than Kaplan and DeMaria’s model) but still overland (so, substantially less indicated by the pressure-wind relationship). It is likely that moving back over to marine exposure allowed the hurricane’s winds to increase somewhat back to 100 kt, given that the system still had 950 mb central pressure right before making oceanfall.]
8. The summary section says the winds in Pensacola were 96 kt, while the September 20 daily section states those winds as 101 kt. Please clarify this.
[The daily section is now corrected to show the 5 min 96 kt winds. Values obtained with shorter averaging times with the old style anemometers were not considered to be reliable.]
9. There are typos in the summary section: “they recorded a 935 mb” should be “they recorded a 935 mb pressure”. Also “Available date” should be “available data”.
Storm #8, 1926:
1. Summary section: “This suggests winds of at least 66 kt…”. Is the ship report with 985 mb and 70 kt close enough to the center that the downgrade in intensity on September 25 is justified? If not, please use the original value.
[The combination of this ship at 08Z with NNE 70 kt wind/985 mb and a second ship at 12Z with S 20 kt wind/996 mb allows for a fairly accurate positioning of the hurricane. The first ship is estimated to have been about 30 nm from the center of the hurricane, supporting – along with the data from the second ship – a reduction in the intensity from 105 down to 90 kt.]
Storm #9, 1926:
1. Is there any detailed data from Belize or the Bay Islands of Honduras that might help refine the track?
[Mike Chenoweth did obtain official records from archives in London, including information from the “Belize Official Record Commissary Building”. However, there was a gap in the recorded archives during 1926 and no additional data (beyond what is available at 12Z in the Historical Weather Maps) are available.]
2. Is a 2-degree southward shift in the track on October 3 justifiable when the data is “somewhat inconclusive”?
[A major southward change to the track of the cyclone is introduced on the 3rd because of easterly ship observations south of the original HURDAT position. Data are somewhat inconclusive, however, whether a closed low was actually present on this date.]
Storm #10, 1926:
1. Why was the intensity lowered on October 14 and not on October 15? Do the available data preclude the possibility the system was a tropical storm on October 14? If so, please state explicitly what the data were?
[Intensification to tropical storm is delayed by 18 hours to 00Z on the 15th, based upon a very weak broad low on the 14th and moderately deeper (~2 mb) pressures recorded in the western Caribbean on the 15th.]
2. Summary section: “Winds are chosen to be 110 kt at 06Z on the 19th (up from 85 kt originally) due to the slow movement of the cyclone”. How slow was the cyclone moving and how was the motion slow enough to justify a lower wind? Also, if the pressure and winds of the 950 mb ob are correct, it is likely the central pressure was lower than 950 mb which would justify a higher wind using the wind-pressure relationships. Please re-evaluate the best track intensities in light of this, starting with making the 19/0600Z intensity at least 115 kt.
[While the system was slow moving up until the 18th, the movement of the hurricane early in the 19th had accelerated to 10 kt, which is only slightly below climatology. The environmental pressures though remained low (outer closed isobar of 1009 mb). Thus it is agreed that the winds need to be boosted. Winds are now assessed in HURDAT as 115 kt at 06Z.]
3. Was the 933 mb reading in Havana on October 20 disregarded? If so, the text should state why.
[The 933 mb report mentioned in the Monthly Weather Review writeup for Havana – which was not in the eye of the hurricane - was not considered to be reliable as it was a momentary value associated with “wind-pumping” of the barometer.]
4. The e-mail of May 26, 2009 had an additional revision of the best track intensities of this hurricane, with lower winds than used in the original proposed revision - especially over Cuba on October 20. What is the basis for the reduced intensity, as it is not explicitly stated in the e-mail? If no basis is available, the committee recommends using the higher winds from the first proposed set of revisions.
[Agreed to keep winds provided in original revision: 130 kt Category 4 striking Cuba.]
5. Extratropical transition: The Historical Weather Maps showed the cyclone becoming extratropical on October 24, yet the revised best track shows it did not. While the evidence that the system was still tropical is stronger on October 25-26, there is a need for additional details of what happened on October 24, especially since a look at the HWM strongly suggests a baroclinic low.
[There is significant uncertainty about the evolution of this system. In reassessing the case, we continue to analyze the cyclone as remaining tropical on the 24th, but at a farther south position. This would keep the main baroclinic zone north of the cyclone on that date. As the committee points out, the system clearly appears to be a tropical cyclone later on (on the 25th and 26th). Introducing a short-lived extratropical structure would be quite unlikely climatologically.]
Storm #11, 1926:
1. November 16 description: This looks incomplete or mis-typed. Please submit the correct summary for the day.
[This has been corrected.]
2. November 16 description: Ship highlight at 28.8N 79.7W. This is so far from the tropical cyclone that it doesn’t seem relevant. Please show the relevance or delete the report.
[Agreed. Ship report deleted.]
2. The extratropical phase mentioned in the summary text does not seem to be there on the track map.
[Agreed. Track map so altered.]
3. What was the lowest pressure actually observed in this system? That might be useful information even if it doesn’t meet the normal criteria used for ‘no other low pressures observed”.
[The lowest believable pressure was a ship on the 13th with 1007 mb and 20 kt E winds, which may also support minimal tropical storm intensity. This has been added into the summary section.]
Additional system #1, 1926: The committee concurs that this system should not be added to HURDAT.
Additional system #2, 1926: The committee concurs that this system should not be added to HURDAT.
Additional system #3, 1926: The committee agrees that the single observation is not by itself enough to justify including this system in HURDAT at this time. However, the observation on September 28 – 35 kt with a simultaneous pressure of 1005 mb – strongly suggests the system was a tropical storm. The committee recommends an additional search for data to see if the necessary second piece of data necessary to include this system into HURDAT can be found.
[A search was conducted, but we were unable to find additional high winds or low pressures. It certainly is plausible that this was indeed a tropical storm.]
Additional system #4, 1926: The committee concurs that this system should not be added to HURDAT.
Additional system #5, 1926: The committee concurs that this system should not be added to HURDAT.